Introduction
The evolution of the religiosity of political elites affects the way religious people intervene in politics. Some have rightly said that "nations organize their government according to the idea they have of God" (Bashiriyeh, 2017: 235). Considering these changes, the main problem of this research is to investigate these developments in two fundamentalist and reformist political tendencies in Ahvaz city. Because we want to check whether the changes in the religiosity of the political elites in Khuzestan have caused changes in their political orientation and political performance? If the answer is positive, what has been the process of these developments in the members of two different political factions? Is it possible to observe a regular trend in the changes in the religiosity of the elites and consequently in their political orientation and political performance? In this study, we try to give empirical answers to such questions. The main purpose of this research is to investigate the changes in the religiosity of the political elites of two fundamentalist and reformist tendencies in the first two decades of the revolution compared to the second two decades of the revolution in Khuzestan province and its impact on their political orientations and practices.

Materials & Methods
The research method in this study is narrative analysis. In this method, the events that happened during a person's life and caused ups and downs in a person's religiosity are discussed. "In a narrative interview, the informed person is asked to narrate the story of the subject in question, in which he/she participated, on the spur of the moment... The questioner forces the informed person to tell the subject in the form of a connected story of events from the beginning to narrate to the end" (Flick 193-1976) In this method, the questioner starts with the question that generates the narrative.
Discussion & Results
The results of these 30 interviewees show that religious divergence has occurred in both fundamentalist and reformist political groups, but this divergence is maximal in the reformist current and minimal in the fundamentalist current. All the interviewees have had a family religious culture and have distanced themselves from this culture. The research data shows that the starting point and the first transformation in all the interviewees is not the same, but each of them had a starting point for some reason. But what is common to most of the interviewees is their reaction to the political performance and behavior of the government based on a strict view and the rigid and dry view of the jurists in facing social issues such as hijab and commanding good and forbidding evil. They have given that they do not reflect a strict religious and political view. It is noteworthy that the average age of the interviewees is about 60 years (i.e. born in the thirties and forties of the 14th century), and on the other hand, the majority of the interviewees were once executors of the ruling policies, but gradually in the course of management, due to their lived experience, They have diverged religiously. Undoubtedly, when this divergence in this average age has occurred among senior and middle managers, naturally, this divergence will be much more among young people. Among the fundamentalist interviewees, we encountered statements such as the following: "I have intellectually come to the conclusion that at times my opinion has conflicted with the opinion of religious authorities, but despite this opinion, I have preferred religious authorities; It means that I have accepted and followed the opinion of the religious authority. Cases like this show that the fundamentalists have looked more religiously and duty-oriented towards the religious and political performance of the government, and the reformists have shown more divergence in this regard.
Conclusion
Most of the interviewees have considered hijab as a customary and social matter and they do not accept compulsory hijab, and in terms of demythologising the belief system and desanctifying religious figures, they have found a desire towards the customary social life. Most of the interviewees do not adjust their opinion with the opinion of Taqlid sources and consider interference in their destiny and their country as a human thing. Their expectations from the Holy Book have been limited and they no longer believe that the Holy Book is the answer to all the intellectual needs of mankind, but they believe that there are many economic and social issues that have nothing to do with the Holy Book. They believe that the Quran is not a book of medicine and economics. This research shows that tremendous social changes are ahead and the transformation in the way of managing affairs is necessary. This research shows that the strict view will not only increase the tendency towards religion, but will strongly cause the divergence of religion. Also, it shows that although the interviewees have maintained their faith in religion and believe in rituals and worships, they are fed up with the instrumental use of religion and in some way have become inclined towards religious secularism in their behavior. The interviewees point to the roots of the anomaly regarding commanding the good and forbidding the bad, and they feel ashamed that they have ordered the good and forbid the bad in some cases during their political life, and that these things are stereotyped, authoritarian, governmental and official. are questioned. The result is that the interviewees have not only seriously distanced themselves from the existing official religion that is provided by the government and government agencies, Friday prayers, schools and other institutions, but a significant number of them have at least in some cases been challenged with Sharia-based religiosity. and have shown a kind of divergence. In their words, there was not much discussion about the success of religious theory for the administration of society, but they often had a critical look at the existing practices and management. It should be noted that the social and economic situation in terms of their political position is not comparable with a significant part of the society and this could have prevented their high dissatisfaction with the current situation.