Introduction
Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, as the founder of Islamic philosophy and the "Second Teacher" (al-Muʿallim al-Thānī), holds a distinguished position in the history of Islamic wisdom. In addition to his pioneering role in Islamic philosophy, the comprehensive scope of his discussions on practical wisdom (ḥikmat ʿamalī), particularly political governance (siyāsat al-madan), has rendered his works unparalleled in their kind. In addressing political governance from the perspective of practical wisdom, Fārābī focused on explicating virtuous and non-virtuous cities (al-madāʾin al-fāḍila wa ghayr al-fāḍila), as well as the characteristics of the ruler of the virtuous city. This Fārābīan scholarly tradition in political governance was, to some extent, pursued by later philosophers; however, the standing of practical wisdom in the history of Islamic philosophy gradually diminished over time, while theoretical wisdom—after a period of hiatus—increasingly flourished. It appears that the decline of practical wisdom, and particularly the topic of political governance, in the history of Islamic philosophy has given rise to the presupposition that after Fārābī, none of the philosophers made any innovations or contributions in this domain. Although the diminished attention to political governance in the history of Islamic philosophy is largely attributable to the reduced engagement of philosophers with this subject, this judgment does not seem to hold true with respect to Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī.
Materials & Methods
To identify Ṭūsī's contributions to the field of political governance in addition to those of Farabi, this study focuses on examining only three issues within the discussions of al-siyāsa al-madaniyya. It is evident that a comprehensive and exhaustive comparison of the views of Ṭūsī and Farabi on political governance would require more space than a single article allows. However, this article employs a documentary method alongside interpretive analysis to examine the views of Fārābī and Khwājah al-Ṭūsī on three key dimensions of political governance namely, ontology, epistemology, and policymaking with the aim of elucidating Khwājah al-Ṭūsī's contributions beyond what Fārābī had previously articulated.
Discussion and Results
By examining at least three issues within the domain of political governance (siyāsat al-modon), one can identify the contributions of Khwājah al-Ṭūsī that have enriched the science of governance (ʿilm al-madanī). The first contribution concerns the ontology of the city (madīna): while acknowledging the complexity of social relations—owing to their intermingling of volitional human relations on the one hand and material, deterministic relations on the other—Khwājah al-Ṭūsī does not affirm the real existence of society as a substantial entity. This position, by taking into account the voluntary and non-deterministic character of human relations, avoids a holistic conception of society in administration and policymaking, thereby resisting the imposition of paternalistic policies upon individuals.
With regard to the ontology of social phenomena, although Khwājah al-Ṭūsī does not posit an independent existence for macro-social phenomena apart from the existence of their constituent micro-level parts, he maintains, from an epistemological standpoint, that macro-level phenomena possess properties and characteristics that are not found in their individual components. In other words, while he is an ontological individualist, he rejects methodological individualism from an epistemological perspective and adopts a holistic viewpoint. This ontological and epistemological stance of Khwājah al-Ṭūsī is consistent with the theory of social emergence. Thus, without falling into the pitfalls of either methodological individualism or ontological holism, he provides a foundation for administration and policymaking that safeguards the fundamental rights of individuals and ensures justice at the societal level.
Another contribution of Khwājah al-Ṭūsī lies in his explication of the social nature of human beings—namely, that man is by nature civic (madaniyy al-ṭabʿ). Although Fārābī also affirms the social nature of human beings, certain scholars have noted inconsistencies in his statements regarding man's innate civic character. According to these observations, differences in individuals' aptitudes and capacities lead some to strive for dominance over others, resulting in a natural state of conflict and strife within society. In any case, while accepting Fārābī's principle concerning the natural inequalities among human beings, Khwājah al-Ṭūsī pays particular attention to the natural condition of mutual need among humans. Thus, within the context of this natural interdependence, differences in aptitude and capacity—rather than engendering antagonism—serve to strengthen cooperation and collaboration among individuals.
Another contribution of Khwājah al-Ṭūsī is that, unlike Fārābī—who confines himself to enumerating the characteristics of the ruler of the virtuous city (raʾīs al-madīna al-fāḍila) without delving into the details of governance, and who broadly regards the explication of justice and its requisite conditions as among the duties of the ruler—he adopts a holistic approach, defining justice while also introducing and elaborating upon its laws and constituent components. On the basis of this approach, while accepting the classification of cities into virtuous and non-virtuous—the latter comprising the ignorant (jāhila), the immoral (fāsiqa), and the erring (ḍālla)—he, unlike Fārābī, provides a model and criterion for this classification. Khwājah al-Ṭūsī identifies the faculty of rational speech (quwwat al-nuṭq), i.e., thought and language, as the criterion for classifying cities. Accordingly, if the inhabitants employ the faculty of rational speech correctly, the city is virtuous; if this faculty is not utilized at all, the city is ignorant; if the faculty of rational speech is subordinated to another faculty—namely, the irascible (ghaḍabiyya) or the appetitive (shahwiyya)—the city is immoral; and if a deficiency in the faculty of rational speech leads to error in the recognition of virtue, the city is erring.
Conclusion
Thus, while acknowledging the intermingling of human and material relations in social phenomena, Khwājah al-Ṭūsī maintains that the natural condition of human beings in society is one of cooperation and collaboration. And although he introduces properties and laws specific to the composite entity of society or the city—properties in which individuals do not share—he does not affirm an independent, real existence for society. Hence, by rejecting both methodological individualism and ontological holism, and by affirming the necessity of a volitional order for the organization and administration of livelihood, he recommends policymaking based on safeguarding individuals' rights and upholding justice at the societal level.